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Abstract On most accounts, beliefs are supposed to fit
the world rather than change it. But believing can have
social consequences, since the beliefs we form under-
write our actions and impact our character. Because our
beliefs affect how we live our lives and how we treat
other people, it is surprising how little attention is usu-
ally given to the moral status of believing apart from its
epistemic justification. In what follows, I develop a
version of the harm principle that applies to beliefs as
well as actions. In doing so, I challenge the often exag-
gerated distinction between forming beliefs and acting
on them.1 After developing this view, I consider what it
might imply about controversial research the goal of
which is to yield true beliefs but the outcome of which
might include negative social consequences. In particu-
lar, I focus on the implications of research into biolog-
ical differences between racial groups.
Keywords Ethics of Belief . Heuristics and biases .
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1. What’s at Stake in the Ethics of Belief
Imperfect knowledge is a fact of life for creatures who
have limited time and scarce information and whose
interest in forming true beliefs is shaped by our practical
goals. Among our many goals is to acquire true beliefs.
Sometimes we seek truth for the intrinsic satisfaction of
understanding how the world works.2 But often we seek
true beliefs only as a means of satisfying more mundane
desires, such as finding our way around the New York
subway system or figuring out which airline will get us
to Hawaii at the lowest price. Since we have goals other
than increasing our understanding of the world, we
constantly face hard choices about the kind and quantity
of information to gather, how long we should spend
sifting through it, and the practical use to which we
might put it.
Among our non-epistemic goals are that our particu-
lar desires are satisfied and that our life goes as well as
possible. Sometimes forming true or justified beliefs can
frustrate these goals, as when your belief that there is no
God or that you have incurable cancer frustrates your
desire to live forever. If our practical goals have at least
some normative authority, we sometimes have good
reasons to ignore evidence that would be salient if we
were only concerned with forming true beliefs, and in
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2As Robert Nozick (1993) suggests, it is reasonable to suppose that our
ancestors’ interest in true beliefs was originally an instrumental
one—it was selected for because it helped us survive and reproduce.
But in a world with less scarcity, more leisure, and a longer life
expectancy, many of us have a greater capacity to form accurate beliefs
about the world and a greater desire to do so.
1According to William Clifford, BNo real belief, however trifling
and fragmentary it may seem, is ever truly insignificant…
gradually it lays a stealthy train in our inmost thoughts, which may
someday explode into overt action, and leave its stamp upon our
character forever^ (1877, 292).
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some cases we may have reasons to (try to) form false
beliefs. For example, if your acceptance of the fact that
you have metastatic cancer makes it difficult for you to
motivate yourself to get up in the morning, you may
have reason—if it is possible—to avoid consuming
detailed information about your grim prognosis, and
you might try to form the belief that, against all odds,
you are likely to overcome it. This may make your final
days more pleasant and may help you satisfy other goals
in the process. Of course, beliefs are not fully voluntary,
so we cannot change them like hats or shoes. But we can
influence our beliefs by either ignoring or seeking out
evidence that bears on a hypothesis, or by altering our
epistemic environment in ways that make such evidence
more or less likely to emerge in our daily interactions.3
The potential conflict between forming true beliefs
and increasing our welfare is made clear when we
distinguish two kinds of rationality, each with its own
aim. Epistemic rationality aims at truth, while
instrumental rationality aims at satisfying our desires,
whatever their content. Robert Nozick (1993, 70) con-
trasts two statements that bring into stark relief the
difference between instrumental and epistemic
rationality:
p is the rational thing to believe
Believing p is the rational thing to do
Suppose Bp^ is the proposition that Bmy client is guilty,^
and it is held by a defence lawyer. The belief may be
justifiable in light of the evidence and ultimately true.
But if a defence lawyer allows herself to form this belief,
especially if her client is accused of an especially grue-
some crime, she might exert less effort defending her
client in court. Similarly, if Bp^ is Bmy basketball team
will lose,^ and it is believed by most members of the
team, theymay not try as hard to win the game.Whether
I ought to believe that my client is guilty or my basket-
ball team will lose depends in part on what the point of
this belief is—to form a justified belief about the world,
given my current evidence, or to accomplish the goal of
defending my client or winning a game.
These examples illustrate how beliefs can become
self-fulfilling (or self-undermining) prophecies. They
can do this partly by functioning as placebos that alter
our confidence that a goal is achievable or worth achiev-
ing. More importantly, these examples show that our
epistemic and practical goals can come apart: our beliefs
about what the world is like can determine whether our
desires are satisfied and more generally how well our
lives go.
In addition to our beliefs affecting our welfare by
altering our actions or character, they can also influence
other people’s welfare. Obvious examples include reli-
gious beliefs that command followers to tolerate infidels
or execute them. But more common cases are beliefs
about who we should vote for or what kind of clothing is
appropriate at a wedding or a funeral. In these cases,
each person’s beliefs inform their actions and have a
small impact on how other people vote or how they
dress. But the aggregate impact of each of these beliefs
(to the extent that people act on their beliefs) shapes
entire cultures, determines who is elected, and affects
the availability and price of different goods.
Our beliefs can affect ourselves and others in many
ways, but I will focus on beliefs that have some advan-
tage for the individual but which may reduce the welfare
of others. Harm can occur either because the belief
causes believers to act in ways that harm others directly
or indirectly (e.g. religious fanatics who kill infidels or
encourage others to do so) or contributes to an epistemic
environment in which people are worse off from the
standpoint of truth (e.g. influential celebrities who pro-
mote astrology as a way of organizing our lives). The
pursuit of truth should not always trump our practical
concerns, but there is at least some reason to be con-
cerned when people spread beliefs that contribute to an
environment that impairs other people’s ability to form
true beliefs or carry out their plans.
2. The Harm Principle
According to the harm principle developed by John
Stuart Mill, Bthe only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others^ (1869). Mill deploys the harm principle as a
normative benchmark for determining when it is appro-
priate to use state power to curtail the freedom of people
to speak and act as they please. But my aim is different
3There are limits to what kinds of beliefs you can try to shed or form
for purely instrumental reasons. For example, if your acceptance of
causal determinism saps your energy and makes it difficult to care
about goals you once found important, you may have good reason to
try to believe causal determinism is false or that it is compatible with
free will (though if causal determinism and free will are, in fact, in
conflict, you cannot have normative reasons to believe otherwise, since
all normative reasons collapse in a world in which our beliefs are
outside of our control).
288 Bioethical Inquiry (2017) 14:287–297
than Mill’s: I want to use a version of the harm principle
to help us draw a principled (but vague) line between
when it is, and is not, morally permissible to form and
act on beliefs that are likely to affect other people,
including how they think and behave. I’ll argue that it
is morally defensible to hold socially consequential
beliefs for which there is imperfect evidence only if
doing so is unlikely to impose significant, uncompen-
sated harm on other people.
The Bimperfect evidence^ proviso is crucial for two
reasons: first, if we know something to be true, it is
arguably impossible to resist believing the proposition;
second, it seems counterproductive from a social stand-
point to continually try to suppress socially consequen-
tial beliefs that are known to be true. Even when evi-
dence is imperfect, it is worth recognizing that moral
and epistemic standards for belief can come into con-
flict. There may be good epistemic reasons for holding a
belief that has bad moral consequences and good moral
reasons for holding a belief that has bad epistemic
consequences.4
Some have argued that the harm principle is hopeless
as a normative standard because there are many different
kinds of harms, because it is arbitrary where we estab-
lish the baseline relative to which harm occurs, or be-
cause the concept of harm is itself so ambiguous and
context-dependent that it is useless in moral thinking
(Holtug 2002; Bradley 2012). But I think these are
benefits rather than costs of value-laden terms like
Bharm,^ Bliberty,^ Brights,^ and Bwelfare.^ The ambi-
guity of Bharm^ allows us to make distinctions between
kinds of harms, including psychological harm, physical
harm, and environmental harm, and to argue about
which kinds of harm matter in particular cases. Global
scepticism about using Bharm^ as a moral standard is
also unwarranted because any term we replace it with,
such as Bbadness,^ is also both vague and ambiguous.
Like Bharm,^ terms like Bbadness^ can be given a
subjective or objective reading and can be used in in-
definitely many ways depending on the context. But this
is not an objection to framingmoral debates around such
terms. Quite the opposite.
Consider how strange it would be if Thomas Jeffer-
son had specified with precision in the Declaration of
Independence what he meant when he invoked a right to
Blife, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.^ Would
Americans be better off if he had listed a precise set of
liberties or specified a particular view of happiness?
Deliberately vague language can also be helpful in
delineating the basic form rights take in a constitutional
democracy, as in the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Consti-
tution. For example, the First Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution protects free speech (BCongress shall make
no law … abridging the freedom of speech … ^) but
enables citizens and judges to work out a more precise
extension of the term as social norms and circumstances
change. For example, some argue that donating to orga-
nizations that fund political advertising is a form of
speech, while others describe donations as an attempt
to buy electoral outcomes. Similar considerations apply
to Bharm.^
Any plausible version of the harm principle should
also acknowledge that even when our actions affect
others in a negative way, allowing harmful actions can
have compensating benefits over the long run. For ex-
ample, when Charles Darwin formulated the theory of
evolution by natural selection, he knew that publishing
his theory would shatter many people’s religious faith
by undermining their teleological worldview. Darwin
confided to his friend Joseph Hooker that Bit is like
confessing a murder^ to say that species are not immu-
table and that, contrary to other evolutionary theories of
the time, organisms do not Bprogress^ toward better or
more perfect forms.
While propagating the theory of evolution by natural
(and sexual) selection undoubtedly caused many to lose
their faith, which brought about some short-run psycho-
logical harm, over the long run Darwin’s theory contrib-
uted to our ability to understand the world and our place
in it and to medical advances that help everyone.
3. Ignorance, Irrationality, and Harm
Believing is often a socially significant act. To return to
a previous example, if we intend to cast a vote in a
national election or discuss politics with other people
whose vote we have the power to influence, forming
beliefs about the issues and candidates has a marginal
impact on the outcome of the election. Since all citizens
(and some non-citizens) incur the legislative conse-
quences of an election, we seem to bear responsibility
for how we go about forming our political beliefs.
The problem is that effort exerted to gather relevant
political information in an unbiased way is costly in the
4And since Bought-implies-can^ only one of these reasons can be
decisive.
Bioethical Inquiry (2017) 14:287–297 289
psychological sense that revising our beliefs and admit-
ting we may be wrong makes us uncomfortable. More-
over, time spent forming beliefs about politics is time
not spent on other activities that we enjoy or that we
have good reasons to engage in. To the extent that good
governance is a shared goal and is best achieved through
democratic elections, the benefits of good faith efforts to
consume unbiased information for the purposes of vot-
ing are shared by all voters, but the costs are internalized
by each voter.
Economists have long argued that most people are
rationally ignorant about politics because they lack the
ability to influence political outcomes with their indi-
vidual vote (Downs 1957). In market settings it is in-
strumentally rational for each of us to gather information
about the products we wish to purchase, since we know
we’ll have to live with the consequences of our choices,
and we are reasonably sure that when we hand over the
cash we will obtain the product we pay for. The beliefs
we form in the marketplace will tend to be epistemically
justified because we need reliable beliefs about the
products we consume for our desires to be satisfied.5
But in politics we know that we have almost no chance
of influencing an electoral outcome by voting, and this
has implications for how much information we collect
and what we do with it.
Notice that markets, too, promote a certain kind
ignorance—one that arguably makes all of us better
off. As Friedrich Hayek argues (1945), there are net
social benefits when each of us specializes in a particular
set of tasks, gathers local knowledge about how to
satisfy our customer’s desires, and then acts on that
knowledge. If I become a mechanic and you become a
plumber, and we trade services, we’re both better off for
the exchange. And the more this happens—the more
fine-grained the division of labour becomes—the better
off we become (Smith 1776, Book I). But we also tend
to become more ignorant about the details of how the
products we buy are made or the scientific principles
that go into creating new products (Smith 1776, Book
V). In this sense, ignorance about howmost things work
is both rational and socially beneficial because it allows
each of us to spend more time doing what we’re good at
and selling the surplus to others. We don’t need to know
how to build cars, create vaccines, or construct sky-
scrapers in order to enjoy the benefits of all of these
things. In markets, then, we are rationally ignorant about
most of what goes on around us apart from our own
occupation and the price and quality of the objects we
buy.
In politics, rational ignorance can be dangerous, es-
pecially if ignorant citizens cast votes. While econo-
mists have focused on rational ignorance, many philos-
ophers and political psychologists have argued that cit-
izens in democratic countries are not only ignorant but
positively irrational (in the epistemic sense) because
they are inclined to consume information in a biased
way (Caplan 2001; Huemer 2015). Most voters engage
in motivated reasoning and are especially susceptible to
confirmation bias in the sources of information they
seek out (Haidt 2012), in part because they understand
the insignificance of forming beliefs about a realm that
they cannot reasonably hope to affect. Thus, democratic
citizens often form beliefs and vote in ways that express
their identity or symbolically affirm their values, rather
than carefully evaluate evidence about the efficacy of
specific policies advanced by political parties or candi-
dates (Brennan and Lomasky 1993; Somin 2013).
If rationally ignorant and epistemically irrational
voters impose net harms on other people, and if
refraining from acting on their beliefs is cheap, they
arguably have a moral obligation not to vote on the basis
of political views for which they lack justification
(Brennan 2009). By extension, they seem to have a
moral obligation not to form strong beliefs in the polit-
ical realm if they will predictably act on them by getting
in political arguments or voting.
These examples illustrate how socially consequential
some of our beliefs are, especially in situations of inter-
dependence, when each of us faces similar incentives
and all of us share the consequences of one another’s
choices. I now want to turn to the moral status of beliefs
about racial differences because these beliefs have pro-
found effects on how we think of other people and how
we treat them. Historically, such beliefs have been used
to justify warfare, slavery, genocide, legally sanctioned
discrimination, and destructive social norms. Less dra-
matically, beliefs about group differences can lead to
implicit bias and subtle forms of racism. If research
suggests that there are genetically mediated differences
between racial groups, would our awareness of them
5This is not to say that all of our desires, especially those induced by
propaganda or influenced by fashion and other social fads, are worth
attempting to satisfy, only that once we have goals in the marketplace,
we will tend to gather reasonably reliable information about how to
satisfy them since we bear the costs and benefits of our choices. This is
not true in situations of interdependence, in which what we choose has
little if any causal influence over the outcome we end up with.
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lead us to treat one another less fairly? And in the
absence of conclusive evidence, should we (try to)
refrain from forming beliefs about different groups, or
should we openly embrace what we think the evidence
suggests?
4. Race Research
The power to uncover the genetic and evolutionary
roots of group differences in psychological traits is
… a prospect that we are, intellectually and emo-
tionally, very poorly equipped to confront.
~Steven Pinker, BGroups and Genes^
In the last few years, a handful of authors have made the
provocative claim that there are small but significant
genetic differences between different groups (or
Braces^) of people and that these differences can explain
some observable differences in behaviour.
Not all academics who maintain that races are merely
social constructions deny that there are biological dif-
ferences between groups of people. For example, Sally
Haslanger (2000) argues that we might divide people up
into lactose tolerant and lactose intolerant, light-skinned
and dark-skinned, or tall and short. All of these proper-
ties have biological (often genetic) causes, and they are
differentially distributed across the human population.
Haslanger rightly argues that we need good reasons to
accept any particular classification and that if the only
point of classifying people is to subordinate or oppress
them, we should reject that classification. But many
researchers do think there are good reasons to make
racial and ethnic classifications in the same way that
there are good reasons to distinguish tables and chairs
even if kinds of furniture are ultimately just bundles of
atoms with different properties. In this sense, most
things around us are socially constructed, but that
doesn’t mean that all socially constructed categories
are equally useful in helping us navigate the world.
Among those who think it is useful to categorize
people into different races or ethnicities, there is some
controversy about how to do so. This is because most
genetic differences, or differences in allele frequencies,
occur within as well as between groups. But some argue
that it helps to have a term like Brace^ to distinguish
average genetic differences between groups, especially
when genetic differences are linked to statistically
significant behavioural outcomes.6 I do not take a posi-
tion on how best to divide human groups. My concern is
only to discuss the implications of beliefs people form
about group differences when these beliefs are sensitive
to scientific discovery about the genetic basis of group
differences.
The claim that there are average differences between
groups in stature, hair texture, skin colour, and other
physical traits is often accepted even by those who think
racial groupings are social constructions. But claims that
genes play a role in producing differences in cognitive
traits that bring success in the modern world—such as
intelligence and impulse control—are often greeted with
embarrassed silence or harsh denunciation, independent
of their scientific merit (Haidt 2009).
Steven Pinker points out that,
… in recent decades, the standard response to
claims of genetic differences [in intelligence] has
been to deny the existence of intelligence, to deny
the existence of races and other genetic groupings,
and to subject proponents to vilification, censor-
ship, and at times physical intimidation. (2006a,
¶29)
Jonathan Haidt recounts that after the publication of E.O.
Wilson’s Sociobiology, which proposed among other
things that gene–culture co-evolutionmight explain some
behavioural differences between groups, Wilson Bwas
harassed and excoriated, in print and in public. He was
called a fascist, which justified (for some) the charge that
he was a racist, which justified (for some) the attempt to
stop him from speaking in public^ (2012, 38). Similarly,
as the author of a recent book on race and evolution
observes, Bthe idea that human populations are genetical-
ly different from one another has been actively ignored
by academics and policymakers for fear that such inquiry
might promote racism^ (Wade 2014, 249).
It appears that many people oppose entertaining the
possibility that small genetic differences might help
explain why, for example, West African athletes tend
to dominate sprinting events or East Asians and
6It is increasingly common to use Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms
(SNPs) to infer the genetic distance between groups (Rosenberg et al
2002). Some scholars use this technique as a way of picking out groups
that correspond to our common conception of Brace^ even when SNPs
involve non-coding DNA (Spencer 2014). Others use Brace^ to refer to
genetically-mediated phenotypic traits that we find salient for social or
scientific purposes (Mayr 2002; Kitcher 2007).
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Ashkenazi Jews tend to excel in mathematics, not be-
cause these hypotheses are demonstrably false but be-
cause believing them (or propagating these beliefs)
would lead to bad social consequences (Hunt 1999;
Pinker 2002). In other words, it looks like many peo-
ple’s implicit commitment to some version of the harm
principle explains why they so vehemently oppose even
the thought that socially significant biological differ-
ences exist between groups.
There are several ways in which forming beliefs
about group differences might lead to social harm.
However, there are also benefits associated with ground-
ing our beliefs in the best evidence available and pursu-
ing that evidence even when there are short-term harms
associated with it. So, this is a good test case for apply-
ing the harm principle developed above. In what fol-
lows, I compare the potential harms and benefits asso-
ciatedwith believing that there are biological differences
between groups of people—differences that correspond,
to some extent, with our folk concepts of race.
Harms
Bias
We all form subconscious judgments about the strangers
we encounter by associating them with particular
groups. For example, attractive people with symmetrical
features are widely considered more competent than
unattractive people, obese people are often thought to
be lazy, and immigrants with unfamiliar accents are
thought to be less trustworthy than native born citizens
(Haidt 2012, 68). Researchers tend to focus on negative
implicit biases that are at odds with our explicit values or
with what we believe to be true. But not all biases are
irrational, and not all stereotypes are inaccurate.
Some scholars argue that in certain domains stereo-
types are remarkably accurate, but that researchers are
afraid to acknowledge this because they are inclined to
believe that Bif stereotypes are associated with social
wrongs, they must be factually wrong^ (Jussim et al.
2015, 34). This is similar to the fact that people who
oppose torture or capital punishment on moral grounds
are more likely to believe that they are not effective
punishments, which is a separate issue that should not
be influenced by our moral judgements.
Other scholars (Cosmides and Tooby 1994;
Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009) argue that many of our
biases and heuristics can be explained as adaptations
that in some cases function better than conscious rea-
soning for the kinds of problems they evolved to solve.
Our distrust of foreigners may be an example of a bias
that was once adaptive but now less useful. Being more
apprehensive of men than women may be a bias that is
still useful. The difference between a Bheuristic^ and a
Bbias^ is not always clear, but in general heuristics are
principles or devices we use, often unconsciously, to
make choices, while biases are attitudes or beliefs that
incline us to view an action, person, or group favourably
or unfavourably. The basis of both is often accumulated
personal experience and inductive generalization from
specific cases to general types. The heuristic that leads
us to fear men more than women may be individually
rational and socially beneficial, since ignoring group
differences would likely lead people, especially women,
to be less cautious around men who want to harm them.
Still, if evidence emerges showing that there are
genetic differences between groups in the distribution
of traits that we care about, it is likely that some people
who believe this evidence will be more likely to use it to
justify unjust prejudice. More specifically, some people
might be more likely to believe stereotypes that lead
them to treat individuals as mere members of a group.
We all use heuristics to guide our everyday choices,
and among these heuristics are stereotypes that may be
instrumentally useful but collectively harmful. When we
choose who will be on our basketball or football team in a
pickup game and the pool of available participants is
racially diverse, it is common to choose people of some
racial groups rather than others in the absence of any other
information. Rational discrimination in this case occurs
either because we justifiably believe members of some
groups tend to play the game more or because we think
they’re more likely to have biological advantages that
make them better players. The aggregate effect of discrim-
ination that is individually rational may be to reinforce
negative stereotypes. Stereotypes in sports are not espe-
cially harmful. But when we stereotype in the classroom
and in theworkplace, it may produce results that are unfair
for particular members of a group and for all members of
a group with whom we associate certain traits.
Résumé experiments illustrate why this is true. Some
studies suggest that names on résumés that are more
likely to be associated with black Americans are less
likely to be given consideration relative to other racial
groups (Bertrand andMullainathan 2004). Political bias,
as gauged by omitting candidates’ names on resumes
but including indicators of political affiliation, may be
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even more prevalent than racial bias (Iyengar and
Westwood 2015). If priming people with indicators of
group membership can lead to discrimination (whether
justified or not) in simple experiments like this, it is
likely that these attitudes are commonly held. Thus,
we might fear that if evidence indicates that different
racial groups have average differences in aptitudes or
propensities, these biases might be exacerbated.
It is also, of course, possible that priming people with
the knowledge that their group is, on average, not very
good at a certain taskmay lead them to exert less effort or
to treat certain options as not viable or salient. The
magnitude and existence of Bstereotype threat^ (as this
has been called) has not been conclusively demonstrated
and has been difficult to replicate (Jussim 2015), but it
seems like a real possibility: while some people welcome
the challenge and try to overcome negative stereotypes,
others might think it’s not worth trying to do something
that, on average, members of their group do not excel at.
Oppression
Muchmoreworrisome than bias, perhaps, is the fact that
beliefs about group differences may lead some to con-
sider one group Bsuperior^ to another. Beliefs about the
superiority of one race over another might lead people
(as it has in the past) to use government power to deprive
some people of legal rights or social entitlements in
virtue of their membership in a group. Historical cases
of race and gender-based oppression are so numerous
that there is no point in providing examples.
Given how potentially damaging these harms are,
and how complex and imperfect the current biological
evidence to support racial differences is, should we
allow ourselves to believe in them? What if evidence
emerges to support certain prevailing prejudices that
have already been used to justify unfair discrimination?
Should we attempt to prevent widespread belief in group
differences by suppressing research or ignoring its con-
clusions if believing them would undermine our ability
to treat other people fairly?
In the absence of compensating benefits, the harm
principle would seem to condemn believing in racial
differences, and this would suggest a moral argument
for spurning research into racial differences (Kitcher
2003, 105). But there are many reasons to think that,
in spite of these risks, refusing to accept evidence for
conclusions we’d prefer not to believe carries its own
risks—including the forgone opportunity to know the
truth, the ability to make rational generalizations, and
the ability to use this information for socially beneficial
purposes. Stigmatizing such research may also lead it to
be done by cranks rather than scientists.
Benefits
Intrinsic Benefits: Truth and Explanatory Power
Steven Pinker rhetorically asks, BDon’t the demands of
rationality always compel us to seek the complete truth?
Not necessarily. Rational agents often choose to be
ignorant.^ Still, Pinker argues, BIf an idea is true, we
had better accommodate our moral sensibilities to it,
since no good can come from sanctifying a delusion^
(2006b). Similarly, James Flynn (famous for discover-
ing the BFlynn effect^) concludes that,
… if Jensen’s thesis [that there are racial differ-
ences in intelligence] is correct, the path to social
justice will be more difficult. However, if he is
correct, he will have done us the favor of forcing
us to face a facet of reality many are reluctant to
accept. Would anyone who holds humane ideals
prefer to pursue them in a fantasy world than in the
real world. (1999, 12)
The answer is only partly convincing. Many scientists
and academics put a high value on truth for its own sake,
at least in domains they care about. But sometimes the
pursuit of truth makes our lives go worse rather than
better, and some illusionsmay be worth preserving either
because they make our individual lives go better or
because they might (in principle) lead to good social
consequences. For example, if athletes who are especial-
ly confident about their abilities tend to perform better, or
cancer patients who are more optimistic about their
prognosis than the evidence justifies tend to live happier
lives, this may be a reason to allow themselves to believe
false propositions. At some point, of course, misplaced
confidence can undermine our ability to achieve our
goals by making us complacent or delusional. More to
the point, if we allow ourselves to believe a proposition
that is contrary to the available evidence, we may end up
acting in ways that harm other people as well as
ourselves—in the case of sports, by letting our team
down, and in the case of cancer, by failing to draft a
legally binding will. These mundane examples show that
it is sometimes worth clinging to epistemically dubious
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beliefs that make our lives go better as long as doing so
doesn’t significantly harm other people. The problem in
making this assessment for socially consequential cases
is that our knowledge of the relevant trade-offs and the
probability of harm is limited, even if we would be
willing to forgo some truth if we knew with certainty
that the social gains from doing so were large.
One thing justified beliefs about racial differences
might help us do is to explain—and also undermine
rather than justify—prejudice against particular groups
of people. For example, many have noticed the aston-
ishing achievements of Ashkenazi Jews over the last
few centuries, and some have attributed a largely bio-
logical cause (Cochran, Hardy, and Harpending 2005).
Informal evidence includes the relative success of Ash-
kenazi Jews in many different countries, even in the
presence of social and legal discrimination. More rigor-
ous evidence comes from the percentage of Nobel prizes
and other scientific accolades Ashkenazi Jews were
awarded in the twentieth century and from the heritabil-
ity of IQ scores (Ashkenazi IQ is the highest in the
world, nearly a full standard deviation above the Euro-
pean average). IQ gaps persist between Ashkenazi Jews
(from Northern Europe) and Sephardic Jews (from
Southern Europe) in every country in which they are
currently found, including Israel and the United States.
An increasingly common explanation for these differ-
ences is that Ashkenazi intelligence resulted from rela-
tively recent natural selection, sexual selection, and
gene–culture co-evolution, all of which can occur rap-
idly in relatively isolated populations with significant
resource scarcity (Cochran and Harpending, 2009).
If all people begin as blank slates (or if all groups
have an identical distribution of intelligence), it is
hard to explain how groups like Ashkenazi Jews in
Europe who have had less access to social benefits
than their surrounding populations outperformed
them in many of the most cognitively demanding
occupations, including science and medicine. On the
assumption that groups are identical, some of the
more gullible citizens of Europe in the early twenti-
eth century began to explain Jewish success as a
product of theft, manipulation, and even supernatu-
ral deals with the devil. Accepting a partly genetic
cause of Jewish success may help explain the obvi-
ous disparities between Jews and other groups who
used their success as an excuse for persecution.
Whether coming to accept this hypothesis would
prevent persecution is hard to know, but it may
satisfy our desire to explain why, in fact, Ashkenazi
Jews have been singled out for their success rather
than their failure.
Similarly, if West Africans (and their descendants
around the world) have superior sprinting skills because
of slight genetic advantages in the quantity or distribu-
tion of fast-twitch muscle mass, we should expect to see
them disproportionately represented in sprinting events
at the Olympic Games, as well as in basketball, football,
and other sports that require these skills. Understanding
this may help satisfy our curiosity about why members
of some groups are more likely than others to excel at
particular activities. As James Crow explains, Bwhenever
a society singles out individuals who are outstanding or
unusual in any way, the statistical contrast between
means and extremes comes to the fore^ (2002, 85).
For example, Crow argues, BConsider a quantitative
trait that is distributed according to the normal, bell-
shaped curve. IQ can serve as an example. About one
person in 750 has an IQ above 148. In a population with
an average of about 108 rather than 100, hardly a notice-
able difference, about 5 times as manywill be in this high
range. In a population averaging 8 points lower, there
will be about 6 times fewer. A small difference of 8
points in the mean translates to several-fold differences
in the extremes^ (2002, p. 85). This fact, Crow believes,
may help explain why East Asians and Ashkenazi Jews
are disproportionately represented in American universi-
ties. Like sprinting skills, IQ reflects the interaction of
genetic predispositions and environmental inputs. But
when empirical regularities occur across different socie-
ties and diverse environments, there is at least some
reason to believe biology plays a role. And knowing this
fact may help us explain the world around us a little bit
better.
Apart from an intrinsic desire to have true beliefs—
beliefs that help us explain and predict events around
us—we may also have reasons to believe in biological
differences between groups (when the evidence justifies
them) in spite of the risks because doing so will have
social benefits. These include medical diagnosis and
fighting rather than reinforcing unjust discrimination.
Instrumental Benefits: Medical Diagnosis and Bias
Recognition
As the previous example suggests, harm can come
not only from the presence of ideas, whether true or
false, but from the absence of hypotheses that are
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not pursued because of an intellectually stifling cli-
mate. For example, many racists and conspiracy
theorists continue to explain Jewish success by ap-
pealing to their moral depravity—the idea that theft,
conspiracy, or even sorcery are the sources of Jewish
success. When beliefs like these are widely shared,
they are more likely to lead to anti-Semitic actions
(like the pogroms in Russia) and policies (like the
Nuremberg laws in Germany). Recognizing differ-
ences, then, may be socially beneficial if it gives a
better explanation of the relative success of different
groups in different domains.
A more pressing way in which research into ra-
cial differences, and a willingness to recognize
them, can be socially beneficial is in medical diag-
nosis. It is increasingly common for physicians to
use information about race to tailor the tests they
recommend and the advice they give to patients.
There is good evidence, for example, that Native
American and Inuit people are especially susceptible
to Type 2 diabetes, sub-Saharan Africans to hyper-
tension and sickle cell anaemia, Ashkenazi Jews to
breast cancer and Tay Sachs disease, and Europeans
to cystic fibrosis and hemochromatosis. Some of
these are purely genetic disease, while others are
predispositions activated by environmental factors
or chance. But even mere predispositions differen-
tially affect populations, and in some cases the
genes that cause them were selected for under con-
ditions in which they conferred some benefit.
Eventually, it is likely that patients will have their
entire genome sequenced, and their susceptibility to
particular disorders or strengths will be able to be
inferred more directly. But until then—until the time
this technology improves, the price falls, and our
understanding of genetics significantly increases—
paying explicit attention to race for medical pur-
poses can be quite useful (Crow 2002). This sug-
gests that healthcare professionals and researchers
should openly acknowledge at least some racial
and ethnic differences but should not use them to
disparage people (for moral reasons) or treat all
members of a group as representing the average
(for scientific reasons).
The fear that recognizing, or explicitly believing
in, racial differences might bolster biases that we’d
prefer not to act on is legitimate. But becoming
conscious of our biases, especially those we think
of as unjustifiable, may help us mitigate them. One
reason economics, psychology, and philosophy are
worth studying is that each subject teaches us ways
in which we systematically make crucial mistakes.
For example, economics teaches us that—contrary
to the way we naturally tend to think—trade is not a
zero-sum game but a game (or situation of interde-
pendence) with increasing returns as trading net-
works expand. Understanding this helps us get a
better grasp on the world and helps us become more
responsible voters.
Similarly, most people are prone from an early age to
stereotype and to treat people as if each of them em-
bodies qualities of an average member of their group.
Understanding this, and learning to sort out useful from
harmful biases, may help us reduce unjust stereotyping
and create a more tolerant and just society. Recognizing
bias, and overcoming it, is a crucial function of moral
learning and epistemic maturity.
A common response to proposals that there are
biological differences between groups—including
race and sex—is to dismiss them outright and to
brand those who believe in such differences as rac-
ists and sexists. This is a serious mistake, not only
because it can create the conditions for treating
those who hold such beliefs unfairly but also be-
cause it tends to reinforce the assumption that a
commitment to moral equality depends on biological
identity. As Anthony Edwards argues, Bit is a dan-
gerous mistake to premise the moral equality of
human beings on biological similarity because dis-
similarity, once revealed, then becomes an argument
for moral inequality^ (2003, 801). If we agree that
our commitment to equality does not depend on the
biological identity of individuals or groups, research
that uncovers these differences should not weaken
our moral commitment. Understanding why people
should be treated as individuals rather than as mere
members of groups should ultimately increase social
welfare by providing us with robust reasons to treat
each other as moral equals (Singer 2011, chapter 2).
All of these considerations suggest that we should
remove the social stigma that currently goes along with
research into the genetic basis of group differences. If
research is likely to be done anyway, it is better to have
findings that can withstand scrutiny than to stay silent
while crackpots generate dubious data that reinforces
existing prejudice (Winegard et al 2017). In other
words, just as some beliefs can cause harm when they
are put into action, so too can the suppression of beliefs.
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Conclusion
Beliefs can be used as weapons, not only because they
can lead us to act in repugnant ways but also because
they affect our epistemic environment. I have argued
that there are clear cases in which beliefs can lead to bad
social consequences, especially in the political realm
where each of us is indirectly affected by the beliefs of
voters and policymakers. In cases like this, we often
have obligations to refrain from forming strong beliefs
or acting on them. I have also argued that there are cases
in which the evidence is inconclusive but suggests a
hypothesis that has the power to produce significant
social harm, or benefits, depending on how we respond
to it. Specifically, the hypothesis that biological differ-
ences exist between groups of human beings has the
power to produce vast amounts of harm by reinforcing
stereotypes and giving members of some groups an
excuse to persecute others. But hypotheses that make
us uncomfortable need not produce bad results. By
leading us to reconsider the proper basis of our moral
commitments and to actively consider the trade-offs
between beneficial and harmful heuristics, beliefs about
group differences need not produce social harm, as they
have in the past, but may offer us the chance to increase
the stock of beliefs that are both true and socially
beneficial.
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